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VISUAL THINKING AND SIMPLICITY IN PROOF
ALAN J. CAIN
Abstract. This paper studies how spatial thinking interacts with sim-
plicity in [informal] proof, by analysing a set of example proofs mainly
concerned with Ferrers diagrams (visual representations of partitions of
integers, and comparing them to proofs that do not use spatial thinking.
The analysis shows that using diagrams and spatial thinking can con-
tribute to simplicity by (for example) avoiding technical calculations,
division into cases, and induction, and creating a more surveyable and
explanatory proof (both of which are connected to simplicity). In re-
sponse to one part of Hilbert’s 24th Problem, the area between two
proofs is explored in one example, showing that between a proof that
uses spatial reasoning and one that does not, there is a proof that is less
simple than either.
1. Introduction
The use of visual thinking in mathematics — broadly encompassing visual
perception and visual imagination — has started to receive substantial atten-
tion from philosophers of mathematics. (See, for example, [MJP05, Gia08b,
Gia10].) This is unsurprising, given the importance that mathematicians
themselves place on visual thinking: famously, Jacques Hadamard wrote of
those he surveyed: ‘Practically all of them avoid not only the use of men-
tal words but also, just as I do, the mental use of algebraic or any other
precise signs; also as in my case, they use vague images.’ [Had49, p. 84]
(Notable exceptions are G.H. Hardy, who wrote: ‘I think almost entirely
in words and formulae. . . I find thought almost impossible if my hands are
cold and I cannot write in comfort’ [Har46, p. 114], and Bertrand Russell,
who noted, in the context of William James’s distinction between the visual
mind and auditory mind: ‘I never think except in words which I imagine
spoken’ [Spa84, p. 57].)
Within the broad area of visual thinking is spatial thinking, meaning
specifically thinking that involves visual images of objects in particular geo-
metric configurations. This is to be distinguished from the visual thinking
involved in symbol manipulation (see, for example, [Gia07, ch. 10]) or in vi-
sualizing structure such as ordered sets, where the geometric configuration
can be varied without affecting the reasoning (see [Gia08a]).
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The epistemological role of spatial thinking has been a particular focus
of philosophers’ attention. How can a particular diagram (which may only
illustrate a special case) yield knowledge about a general case? (For a dis-
cussion, see [Dov02].) If a proof requires spatial thinking, is one justified
in accepting the theorem? Spatial thinking can be misleading, particularly
(but not only) with regard to limits of infinite processes (see, for example,
[Gia07, pp. 3ff.]).
This paper leaves aside the epistemological controversy and instead fo-
cusses on how spatial thinking interacts with simplicity in proof. The moti-
vation includes two aspects of Hilbert’s 24th Problem (see [Thi03]): ‘crite-
ria of simplicity’ and ‘the area lying between the two routes’. Does spatial
thinking contribute to simplicity? Many mathematicians seem to think so;
witness the famous ‘proofs without words’ features in Mathematics Maga-
zine and The College Mathematics Journal and collected in [Nel93, Nel00].
Gardner said of these that ‘in many cases a dull proof can be supplemented
by a geometric analogue so simple and beautiful that the truth of a theorem
is almost seen at a single glance’ [Gar99, ch. 16] (emphasis added). If so, in
what ways does spatial thinking lead to gains in simplicity? And what can
be said about the ‘area lying between’ two proofs that use and that do not
use spatial thinking?
The approach is to examine carefully particular proofs that use spatial
thinking (for brevity, henceforth ‘spatial proofs’) to see how the spatial
thinking contributes to simplicity. All the proofs considered in this pa-
per are informal proofs. Although diagrammatic formal systems have been
developed (see, for example, [Mil01]), most proofs that employ spatial think-
ing are informal. Furthermore, simplicity is a property that is more readily
identified in informal proofs; as Iemhoff has noted, it seems difficult to deter-
mine the extent to which simplicity is preserved under formalization [Iem17,
p. 147]. The main (but not sole) focus is what can broadly be called ‘pebble
diagrams’: representing natural numbers using dots, or, as the Pythagoreans
did, pebbles. (See [Bur20, pp. 100ff.] or [Bur72, p. 33] for historical back-
ground and sources.) Such diagrams are still used in modern mathematics,
for instance in the guise of Ferrers diagrams of partitions (Section 4 below).
There are two reasons for this choice. First, with one exception, the theo-
rems discussed do not require any spatial thinking to understand. Second,
considering only proofs about discrete quantities may at least mitigate some
of the concern about whether the proofs are legitimate, since these avoid
situations where limits of infinite processes play a part. For comparison,
proofs that do not use spatial thinking (for brevity, ‘non-spatial proofs’) are
sometimes outlined insofar as necessary to compare them with the spatial
proofs. (It is perhaps worth noting that Sylvester, author of the paper in
which Ferrers diagrams were first published, declared himself perfectly sat-
isfied by proofs that use them; he describes such a proof as ‘so simple and
instructive, that I am sure every logician will be delighted to meet with
it here or elsewhere’ [Syl04, p. 597]. Ferrers diagrams were suggested by
Sylvester’s correspondent Ferrers; see [Kim99] for a discussion of the origin
of the name.)
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Detlefsen [Det96, p. 87] distinguished verificational simplicity and inven-
tional simplicity of a proof: the former is the simplicity found by a reader
who sets out to work through and check the proof; the latter is the sim-
plicity involved in discovery of the proof in the first place. To this, one
can add explanatorial simplicity: that is, the simplicity found by the reader
who sets out to understand how the proof explains the theorem. The no-
tion of explanation in mathematics, and how it compares with explanation
in the natural sciences, is debated (see, for example, [Man01, Zel13]). In
particular, there is disagreement over whether proofs that use induction are
explanatory [HSS13, Lan09].
The examination of proofs here is concerned with verificational and ex-
planatorial simplicity. Prima facie, from this perspective, a proof has greater
simplicity if it avoids technical calculations, complicated notation, division
into many cases, the use of technical results, ‘deus-ex-machina auxiliary
functions’ [Tuc97, pp.239–240], or (given the debate over explanatoriness
mentioned in the last paragraph) induction. Length has also been suggested
as a criterion of simplicity; for instance by Thiele & Wos [TW02] and Arara
[Ara17] (but see the countervailing views of of Iemhoff [Iem17]), but con-
sideration of length if avoided in what follows, because the difficulties of
comparing lengths of proofs outside of the same formal system are mul-
tiplied when one considers comparing proof steps that use diagrams with
those that do not.
2. Diagrams and spatial thinking
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between spatial think-
ing and using diagrams. On the one hand, a proof can use diagrams and
not call upon spatial thinking. Standard examples would be ‘diagram chas-
ing’ proofs of results using commutative diagrams (see, for instance, [ML98,
Lemma VIII.4.1, pp. 202–203]). In such proofs, an element is ‘chased’ around
a diagram of arrows between objects. These arrows represent morphisms,
and alternative paths of arrows between different objects correspond to equal
compositions of homomorphisms. But at no point is spatial thinking actu-
ally used: the diagram could be redrawn in a messy form (say, with arrows
unnecessarily criss-crossing and objects scattered arbitrarily), or even be re-
placed with a list of equalities of compositions of homomorphisms and the
proof could remain identical. Thus, while analyzing how diagrams of arrows
can simplify proofs (which is the very starting point of category theory, ac-
cording to Mac Lane [ML98, p. 1]), such analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper.
On the other hand, a proof can involve spatial thinking and yet involve
no actual diagram. An example is Gale’s proof of the Hex Theorem, which
shows that a game of Hex cannot end in a draw. A Hex board is usually a
rhomboidal grid of hexagons (traditionally 11×11, but more generally n×n
or even n × m), with sides of the rhombus alternately coloured black and
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white, like the following:
Theorem (Hex theorem). If evey hexagon on the board is coloured black or
white, then there is a path of black hexagons linking the two black sides or a
path of white hexagons linking the two white sides.
The following proof is due to Gale [Gal97, pp. 820–2], but is presented in
a minimal form here:
Spatial proof. Define a path as follows. The path enters the board at the
south, with the black side of the board on its left and white side of the
board on its right. Inductively extend the path as so that there is always
black on the left and white on the right: this is possible since whenever one
reaches a junction of edges of hexagons, the hexagon or the part of the side
of the board that lies directly ahead is either black (in which case the path
turns right) or white (in which case the path turns left). The path thus
defined does not intersect itself itself, since the first intersection would have
to involve all three edges incident to a given point, at least one of which has
the same colour on each side, which would contradict the path’s definition.
Since there are finitely many edges, the path must therefore exit the board
at a join between the sides. The path always has black on the left and
white on the right, so must exit either at the east (in which case the black
hexagons on its left link the two black sides of the board) or the west (in
which case the white hexagons on its right side link the two white sides of
the board). 
This proof involves no diagram, but it does appeal to spatial thinking, in
particular when the reader must visualize the how the hexagons along one
side of the path link the black or white sides. This appeal to spatial thinking
has the merit of leading to a much simpler proof than the previously-known
one, which invoked the Jordan Curve Theorem; see the discussion by Gale
[Gal97, 820]. This is the first gain in simplicity supplied by spatial thinking:
avoidance of invocation of technical results.
3. Spatial reasoning and induction
One of the canonical examples of a ‘proof without words’ [Nel93, p. 60]
and of the use of spatial thinking in proving a numerical result, is of the
formula for the sum of the first n integers:
Theorem.
∑n
i=1 i =
n2
2
+ n
2
.
Spatial proof.
(3.1)
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
Non-spatial proof, abbreviated. Proceed by induction on n:
Base of induction:
1∑
i=1
i = 1 =
12
2
+
1
2
.
Inductive hypothesis:
n∑
i=1
i =
n2
2
+
n
2
Inductive step:
n+1∑
i=1
i =
( n∑
i=1
i
)
+ (n+ 1)
=
n2
2
+
n
2
+
2n
2
+
2
2
=
(n+ 1)2
2
+
n+ 1
2
. 
How does the spatial proof ‘work’? Brown [Bro08, pp. 40–1] notes that
mathematician and philosophers divided into two roughly equal groups. One
group holds that the diagram encodes an induction, and is thus a legitimate
proof. The other group holds that the diagram is a heuristic device that
suggests an induction, and that it is this suggested induction that is a legiti-
mate proof. Brown himself holds that there is no induction present, arguing
that ‘Some “pictures” . . . are windows to Plato’s heaven’ [Bro08, p. 40],
or, less poetically but perhaps more accurately, that ‘As telescopes help the
unaided eye, so some diagrams are instruments . . . which help the unaided
mind’s eye.’ [Bro08, p. 40]
Do these opposing views have implications of simplicity in proof? Let
us accept that the picture supplies a valid proof, whether by encoding or
suggesting an induction or by aiding the mind’s eye. With this proviso, I
think that few would disagree that the spatial proof is simpler than the
inductive proof.
Let us consider first the possibility that the diagram encodes or suggests
an induction. Chihara [Chi04, pp. 302–3] describes the thought-process
that the diagram triggers. In abbreviated form, it is as follows: When one
examines the diagram, one sees that to go from the n-th to the (n + 1)-
th row, one has to duplicate the n-th row and add another square, and so
there are n + 1 squares in the (n + 1)-th row. Thus, ‘an intuitive version
of mathematical induction’ allows one to see that for any n, the number
of squares in the n-th row will be n. Therefore calculating
∑n
i=1 i requires
calculating the total number of squares in the diagram, which is n2/2+n/2,
by the formula for the area of a triangle plus the number of squares supplied
by the shaded half-squares.
One can view this thought-process as extracting an induction encoded
in the diagram, or as constructing an induction suggested by it. Whichever
view one holds not seem relevant for simplicity: the point is that if the proof
is through an induction triggered by the diagram, it must be simpler than
the induction in the non-spatial proof. Of course, the spatial proof does
not require any notation and is simpler in that respect. But is it simpler in
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some other way? Possibly the diagram serves to guide the reader through the
induction in a way that is simpler than the non-spatial proof. But drawing
this inference seems unwarranted, for the two inductions are fundamentally
different, and end at different points. The induction in the non-spatial proof
leads directly to the statement of the theorem. The induction triggered by
the diagram shows that the 1 square plus 2 squares plus . . . plus n squares
form what may be described as a ‘step-triangular shape’ of side n, which
is a geometric statement, and it is from this geometric statement that the
result is deduced.
Now return to the possibility suggested by Brown that the diagram aids
the mind’s eye, without any inductive process. In this case, I suggest that the
thought-process is that one immediately perceives that the partially shaded
squares form a diagonal, and that two conclusions follow from this imme-
diately: the diagram is n squares wide and n squares high, the particular
number n in the actual diagram never being noticed. Therefore the lengths
of the rows are 1, 2, . . . , n. Calculating
∑n
i=1 i thus requires calculating the
total number of squares in the diagram, which is n2/2+n/2, by the formula
for the area of a triangle plus the number of squares supplied by the shaded
half-squares, as in Chihara’s description above. Since the particular number
n in the diagram remained unnoticed, this holds for all n.
The simplicity here seems to arise from the fact that the perception of
the diagonal is immediate and the conclusions from it are almost built into
the geometric perception. That is, it is the absence of induction and its
replacement with spatial thinking (or, if one prefers, the view of Plato’s
heaven) that makes the picture proof simpler.
In summary, this discussion has suggested several ways in which spa-
tial reasoning leads to gains in simplicity: first, decreased complexity (or
elimination) of notation; second, depending on the position one takes on
the triggering of an induction, either an easier-to-understand induction or
an avoidance of induction. However, it could be argued that in the ‘non-
inductive’ thought-process I described above there could be a hidden induc-
tion that a mathematically-trained reader can do ‘without thinking’ and that
an untrained reader could intuit. A more convincing example of avoidance
of induction will be considered in Section 5 below.
4. Definitions and inferences
This section and the following ones consider spatial proofs involving par-
titions of numbers, using Ferrers diagrams. Only the background necessary
for understanding the proofs below is recalled here; see [And76] for further
reading.
A partition of a natural number (that is, positive integer) n is a finite
nonincreasing sequence of natural numbers λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λk) that sums
to n; the λi are the parts of the partition. For example, a partition of 24 is
(8, 6, 6, 3, 1). A Ferrers diagram or Ferrers graph is a visual representation of
such a partition as an array of dots, left-aligned, with the i-th row (counting
from the top) containing λi dots. For example, the following Ferrers diagram
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represents the partition (8, 6, 6, 3, 1):
Since a partition is a non-increasing sequence, the rows of a Ferrers diagram
are non-increasing in length from top to bottom, and a left-aligned array of
dots forms a Ferrers diagram (that is, represents a partition) precisely when
this condition is satisfied.
Finite nonincreasing sequences of of natural numbers and Ferrers dia-
grams are thus alternative representations of partitions. As Starikova [Sta10]
has pointed out, alternative representations of mathematical objects can cer-
tainly ease the doing of mathematics, not just in proof, but in discovery and
in formulation of new concepts.
A fundamental result in partition theory, due to Euler, is the following:
Theorem ([And76, Theorem 1.4]). The number of partitions of n with at
most m parts equals the number of partitions of n in which no part exceeds
m.
Spatial proof. Reflect the Ferrers diagram of a partition along its main di-
agonal:
(4.1) 7→
This gives a bijection between the two classes of partitions. 
This bijection could be defined non-spatially as
(4.2) (λ1, λ2, . . . , λk) 7→ (µ1, µ2, . . . , µp),
{
where µi is the number
of λj that are greater
than i.
.
However, this definition is less simple. First, the reader grasps the spatial
definition ‘reflecting along the diagonal’ immediately, whereas one has to
pause and think to understand (4.2). Second, there are two inferences that
are immediate from the spatial definition, but require some thought to de-
duce from (4.2). The first inference is that the map is well-defined, in the
sense that the image is a partition, and indeed a partition of the same natu-
ral number n. This is not difficult to prove from (4.2), but is trivial from the
spatial definition, since reflection preserves both the non-increasing lengths
of lines and the total number of dots. The second inference is that the map
is a bijection (and indeed an involution): trivial from the spatial definition,
but requiring some work to prove from (4.2).
This is another gain in simplicity from spatial reasoning: simpler defini-
tions of transformations using visual representations, and simpler inference
of properties of those transformations (such as bijectivity). Notice that the
particular choice of visual representation using Ferrers diagrams that en-
ables the definition of the bijection using reflection in (4.1). Different visual
representations are possible, such as representing the partition (8, 6, 6, 3, 1)
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as
or or ,
but none of these representations gives rise to such a simple definition of the
bijection as (4.1), nor to such simple inference of its properties.
5. Ferrers diagrams in a more spatial proof
Let ℓ,m, n ∈ N. Let ξ1ξ2 · · · ξℓ+m be a permutation of 1
ℓ2m. An inversion
in this permutation is a pair (i, j) such that i < j and ξi = 2 and ξj = 1.
(That is, a symbol 1 after a symbol 2.) Let Inv(m, ℓ;n) denote the set
of permutations ξ1ξ2 · · · xℓ+m of 1
m2ℓ that have exactly n inversions. Let
P (m, ℓ;n) denote the set of partitions of n into ℓ parts, each at most m.
Theorem ([And76, Theorem 3.5]).
∣∣P (ℓ,m;n)∣∣ = ∣∣Inv(ℓ,m;n)∣∣.
The following proof is a modified version of [And76, Proof of Theorem
3.5].
Spatial proof. The aim is to define an explicit bijection between the set of
partitions P (m, ℓ;n) and the set of permutations Inv(m, ℓ;n).
Consider a partition of n with at most ℓ parts, each at most m. Place an
m× ℓ grid around its Ferrers diagram and ‘wrap’ the diagram with a path
following the grid, as follows:
(5.1)
︷ ︸︸ ︷m
︷︸
︸︷ℓ
Trace the steps made by path through the grid starting at the upper-right
and moving leftwards and downwards. If the path makes a downwards step,
write 2. If it makes a leftward step, write 1. The resulting sequence contains
m symbols 1 and ℓ symbols 2, and so is a permutation of 1m2ℓ.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between dots of the Ferrers
diagram and symbols 1 (leftward steps) after symbols 2 (downward steps):
(5.2)
︷ ︸︸ ︷m
︷︸
︸︷ℓ
So there are exactly n inversions in this permutation.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between partitions and paths,
this defines a bijection between the permutations of 1m2ℓ with exactly n
inversions and the number of partitions of n with at most ℓ parts, each of
size at most m. This completes the proof. 
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5.1. Comparison of simplicity relative to a non-spatial proof. Spa-
tial thinking is used at the following steps of the proof:
(S1) The definition of the path that wraps a Ferrers diagram of the par-
tition. (Note that the definition is incomplete without the diagram.
In particular, the reader is expected to understand the meaning of
‘wrap’ directly from the diagram.)
(S2) The definition of the sequence determined by the path, which uses
the visual idea of travelling along the path, and of making leftward
or downward steps.
(S3) Deduction that this sequence is a permutation of 1m2ℓ, which is
immediate from the correspondence of symbols 1 and 2 to (respec-
tively) leftward and downward steps, and the horizontal and vertical
distance that the path must cover.
(S4) Deduction that there one-to-one correspondence between inversions
in the permutation and points of n, which follows from the spatial
arrangement of the dots in the Ferrers diagram.
(S5) Deduction that there is a one-to-one correspondence between parti-
tions and paths, which is immediate because the Ferrers diagram is
seen to precisely fill the path, so that a path determines the corre-
sponding Ferrers diagram and vice versa.
A non-spatial syntactic proof could proceed (in outline) as follows:
(N1) Definition of a map φ taking partitions to sequences, given by
(5.3) φ(λ) = 1m−λ121λ1−λ221λ2−λ32 · · · 1λk−1−λk21λk2ℓ−k.
(N2) Deduction that φ(λ) is a permutation of 1m2ℓ, which requires an
explicit calculation of the total number of symbols 1 and 2 in the
sequence defined by (5.3).
(N3) Deduction that φ(λ) contains exactly n inversions, which again re-
quires an explicit calculation using the definition (5.3).
(N4) Deduction that there is a one-to-one correspondence between P (m, ℓ;n)
and Inv(m, ℓ;n):
(N4a) Proof of injectivity: given φ(λ), the tail of symbols 2 at the
end determines k; the string of symbols 1 immediately to the
right of the k-th symbol 2 determines λk; by induction, knowing
λi+1, the string of symbols 1 immediately to the right of the i-th
symbol 2 determines λi.
(N4b) Proving that the image of P (m,k;n) is Inv(m,k;n): a nota-
tionally messy argument producing a partition mapping onto a
given permuation of 1m2ℓ with n inversions.
Notice that there is a broad correspondence in overall structure between
the given spatial proof and the non-spatial proof outlined above:
(S1)
(S2)
}
←→ (N1), (S3)←→ (N2),
(S4)←→ (N3), (S5)←→ (N4)
{
(N4a)
(N4b)
.
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Considered on this level of overall structure, therefore, there is little dif-
ference in the simplicity of the two proofs. However, within corresponding
steps, there are major differences in simplicity. The definition (N1) is no-
tationally less simple than (S1)–(S2), and in particular in (N1) it has been
necessary to introduce notation for a partition and its parts. Steps (S3)
and (S4) seem simpler than (N2) and (N3): the former are immediate on
making certain visual observations, while the latter require explicit (though
admittedly not difficult) calculations. Most importantly, step (S5) is sim-
pler, again being immediate, but (N4) in particular uses an induction.
There seem to be two gains in simplicity from spatial thinking here: sim-
pler definitions of maps using visual representations, and simpler inference
of properties of those maps. This is to be distinguished from the gains in
simplicity related to transformations discussed in Section 4. Here, there is
greater simplicity even though the visual representation is being used to
define, not another visual representation of [a mathematical object of] the
same species, but a sequence.
The contrast between use of induction in step (N4) but nowhere in the
visual proof requires further attention since, as discussed above in Section 3,
there is disagreement over whether the diagram (3.1) triggers an induction
(whether by encoding or suggestion). It is thus necessary to consider the
possibility that, at least for some readers, (5.1) triggers an induction.
There is an obvious contrast with (3.1), because the increasing length of
rows in (3.1) corresponds to the statement one wishes to deduce. That is,
the visualization (of how additional rows increasing in length) parallels the
induction (on the number of rows). There seems no such obvious correspon-
dence in (5.1). At this point, the proof considers the Ferrers diagram of
a partition of n with at most ℓ parts, each at most m. An induction on
ℓ and/or m corresponds to extending the grid to the right or downwards.
Certainly, the reader is called upon to visualize an m×ℓ grid of for arbitrary
ℓ and m, but no conclusion is drawn directly from this in the way that the
conclusion about lengths of rows is drawn in (5.1). One could consider in-
duction on n, or the number of parts, or on the lengths of the parts. But this
would involve assuming the existence of a unique path wrapping around the
Ferrers diagram and satisfying certain properties, then adding one or more
squares and deducing the existence of a unique path wrapping aroung the
diagram and satisfying certain other properties. (One hesitates to try to
write down such an induction.) However, this seems very far from the spa-
tial thinking of wrapping the Ferrers diagram. So this seems to be a rather
more certain instance of spatial thinking leading to a gain in simplicity by
avoidance of induction than the proof discussed in Section 3.
Returning to the relative simplicity of the two proofs: the spatial proof
is also simpler because it has greater unity : the definition of the path and
all but one deduction step appeal to spatial thinking by calling on the same
diagram. The remaining step deductive step appeals to spatial thinking
about a second diagram that is very closely related to the first. Once could
even combine the diagrams, but this requires using a diagram for (S1)–
(S3) that contains information that is not relevant until (S4). This would
arguably be a decrease in simplicity; it certainly seems to be a decrease in
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elegance. This increased unity is perhaps linked with better surveyability
of the proof: the unity increases the ease with which ‘[t]he mathematician
surveys the proof in its entirety and thereby comes to know the conclusion’
[Tym79, p. 59] (emphasis in original).
5.2. Between the proofs. In (S1), the path is defined by example. One
could avoid this and use an explicit definition:
(T1) For the partition λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) the path is the map πλ : [0, 1] →
R
2 defined by. . . ,
giving explicit coordinates for the images of each point πλ(t). This still
defines the path as an object in the Euclidean plane, but without requiring
spatial thinking of the reader. (Although many readers would doubtless try
to visualize the definition.) Is (T1) more or less simple than (S1)? On the
one hand, (T1) has introduced a new concept, in the form of an explicit
coordinate system; on the other hand, it has eliminated a concept, in the
form of the Ferrers diagram.
There could conceivably be many proofs beginning with (T1): here only
one is considered. Suppose the next steps are:
(T2) Definition of a sequence from the path πλ.
(T3) Deduction of what the sequence is in terms of λ.
The conclusion of (T3) would be (5.3); the proof could then proceed via
(N2)–(N4). Now, (T1) was an attempt to explicitly define the path used in
(S1) without using spatial thinking. Thus the proof (T1)–(T3), (N2)–(N4)
can be thought of as between the spatial proof (S1)–(S5) and the non-spatial
proof (N1)–(N4). However, it is certainly less simple than either the spatial
or the non-spatial proofs. It shares the explicit calculations and induction
of the non-spatial proof, and yet it uses the path πλ to do what (N1) does
by definition.
Thus a na¨ıve attempt to ‘de-spatialize’ the original spatial proof may re-
sult in a decrease in simplicity, even if there is another non-spatial proof that
is of greater simplicity in than the resulting ‘de-spatialized’ one. (Of course,
in this particular case, a hypothetical mathematician who had formulated
(T1)–(T3) would doubtless notice that all mention of the paths πλ could be
eliminated and would obtain the non-spatial proof (N1)–(N4).)
6. Spatial thinking and exhaustion of cases
Euler’s pentagonal number theorem is the following identity:
Theorem.
∞∏
m=1
(1− xm) = 1 +
∞∑
n=0
cnx
n, where cn =
{
0 if n 6= k(3k ± 1)/2,
(−1)k if n = k(3k ± 1)/2,
It is related to partitions because it can be shown that cn = pe(n)−po(n),
where pe(n) and po(n) are, respectively, the numbers of partitions of n into
an even number and into an odd number of unequal parts. The combina-
torial proof by Franklin [Fra81], as explained by Hardy [Har40, § 6.2] and
Hardy & Wright [HW08, § 19.11], uses transformations of Ferrers diagrams
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establish a near-correspondence between partitions of n into an even num-
ber and into an odd number of unequal parts, with exactly correspondence
or an excess of one partition of each type giving rise to the cases where
pe(n)− po(n) is 0, 1, or −1.
Spatial proof, key steps only. Define the base to be the bottommost row of
the diagram, and define the slope to be the longest line of dot starting at
the top-rightmost and moving towards the bottom-left, as in the following
diagram:
base
slope
Define partial transformations O and Ω by (respectively) moving the base
to lie parallel to the slope, provided this the result is a Ferrers diagram with
unequal parts, and moving the slope to form a new base, provided that the
result is a Ferrers diagram with unequal parts:
O : 7→ ;
Ω : 7→ .
Clearly O and Ω are mutually inverse and so are partial bijections. The key
to the proof is establishing that one of O or Ω is defined except when the
base and the slope meet and when the lengths of the base and slope are
equal or when the length of the base exceeds the length of the slope by 1:
(6.1)
since it is precisely in these cases that for both O and Ω, attempting the
transformations yields a configuration of dots that does not form a Ferrers
diagram with unequal parts.
The proof concludes by showing that n = k(3k ± 1)/2, with an excess of
one partition of odd or even type depending on the parity of k. 
Here, the key role played by spatial thinking is in realizing that O or Ω is
defined, except in the specified cases. It is unnecessary to introduce notation
or explicitly enumerate the cases for lengths of the base and slope. That is,
spatial reasoning allows simpler exhaustion of cases. Further, it is spatial
thinking that makes it possible to use the condition ‘provided that the result
is a Ferrers diagram with unequal parts’. Giving a non-spatial definition of
the partial transformations O and Ω would require first defining the length
of the base and the slope of a partition λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) with unequal parts:
the former is just λk, but the length of the slope is the maximum i such that
i ≤ k and λ1, . . . , λi is a sequence of consecutive decreasing natural numbers.
Then the map O would be defined when λk is less than this i. That is,
preliminary technical definitions would be required before the map O can
be defined. Thus we have an even stronger instance of how spatial thinking
can allow a simpler definition of a [partial] transformation, as discussed in
Sections 4 above. Here there a greater contrast between the simplicity of
the spatial and non-spatial definitions, even though the transformation itself
is more complicated than (4.1).
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(In his original proof, Franklin [Fra81, pp. 448–9] does not attempt a
general definition, but only describes in text the transformation O when the
base contains 1, 2, or 3 elements, and remarks that this can be extended
step by step to all partitions, excepting those ‘in which the indicated process
is not applicable’ [Fra81, p. 449 (my translation)]. Since Franklin does
not give the conditions under which the transformation O is defined, even
without proof, I suspect that his text is actually describing a process that
he was visualizing using Ferrers diagrams or some similar representation.
Ferrers diagrams were first published by Sylvester in 1853 [Syl04]. Franklin’s
proof was published in 1881, so it is likely he was acquainted with Ferrers
diagrams. Furthermore, Sylvester [Syl04, p. 597] speculates that Euler used
used Ferrers diagrams, so the idea may have been ‘in the air’ for much longer.
However, this is no more than a suspicion.)
7. Spatial thinking, purity, and simplicity
Arara [Ara17, pp. 209-211] has pointed out that, in many instances, im-
pure proofs are held to have greater simplicity. Impure proofs are those
that establish a theorem by calling upon a different area of mathematics:
for example, Dirichlet’s theorem that for any coprime natural numbers a
and d there are infinitely many primes of the form a + nd, a result whose
statement is part of elementary number theory, was first proved by analysis.
(For an overview of the notion of purity in proof, see [Det08].) In the exam-
ples concerning partitions above, there certainly seems to impurity, although
perhaps of a slightly different form: it is not another area of mathematics
that is called upon, but rather ‘pre-mathematical’ spatial thinking.
Dedekind was partly motivated to develop the theory of what are now
called Dedekind cuts to show that analytical theorems could be re-expressed
as theorems about natural numbers [Ste88, § V], which would alleviate the
epistemological concerns of impurity in proof (which go back to Aristotle’s
‘meta´basis eis a´llo ge´nos’). Similarly, as discussed above, the proofs using
Ferrers diagrams could be re-expressed in non-spatial terms. But, as shown,
this change would immensely decrease the simplicity. Ferrers diagrams are
more than simply another form of notation like a sequence (λ1, . . . , λk).
They are more than just a book-keeping device. They are a vehicle that
enables spatial thinking about partitions, and it is this spatial thinking that
yields the simpler proofs.
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